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Evidence-Criminal Prosecutions-Rule Excluding Other Crimes
Defendant was indicted for murder. Evidence was admitted, over
objection, that the defendant had confessed that he was an escaped pris-
oner from the South Carolina Penitentiary where he was under life
sentence for murder. The trial judge charged the jury to consider such
evidence only as it might bear on the motive and intent of the defendant
in relation to the alleged killing. The defendant offered no evidence.
Upon conviction and appeal, held, error to admit such evidence because
"the record is barren of any evidence to connect the offense charged
with the defendant's past criminal record"; judgment reversed, case
remanded for new trial.1 State v. Kelly,2 where evidence of previous
escape was held properly admitted, was expressly modified although the
court suggested that "distinguishing differences" existed.3
In the principal case the court states the rule excluding evidence of
other crimes or acts of misconduct in criminal prosecution as a broad
rule of exclusion4 with certain "well recognized" exceptions.5 The ex-
ceptions, upon close analysis, prove to be the criteria in the determination
of the relevancy of the previous offense to the offense charged; that is,
design or plan, knowledge or belief, intent, motive, identity, or other
acts which are an inseparable part of the whole deed." The basic rule
of relevancy favors the admissibility of all facts affording any reason-
able inference to the act charged with the exception of the character
rule which excludes conduct tending and offered to show bad moral
character or disposition. 7 Obviously, the court has inverted the criteria
of relevancy through which the basic rule operates into categories of
exceptions to a broad rule of exclusion. In place of the inquiry, "Is
this evidence relevant otherwise than merely through propensity (to
1 State v. Fowler, 230 N. C. 470, 53 S. E. 2d 853 (1949). The State contended
that this evidence shows or reasonably infers that defendant's motive was his fear
that the deceased knew about his escape from the South Carolina prison. See
Brief for the State-Appellee, p. 6. On second trial, defendant's plea of guilty to
accessory before the fact was accepted by State. Minute Docket 30, p. 405,
August 1949 Criminal Term of the Superior Court of Moore County.
2216 N. C. 627, 6 S. E. 2d 533 (1940). See note 15 post.
' State v. Fowler, 230 N. C. 470, 475, 53 S. E. 2d 853, 857 (1949).
" "We start with the general rule that evidence of one offense is inadmissible
to prove another and independent crime, the two being wholly disconnected and
in no way related to each other." Id. at 473, 53 S. E. 2d at 855.
' "To this general rule, however, there is the exception as well established as
the rule itself, that proof of the commission of other like offenses is competent to
show the quo animo, intent, design, guilty knowledge or scienter, or to make out
the res gestae, or to exhibit a chain of circumstances in respect of the matter on
trial, when such crimes are so connected with the offense charged as to throw
light upon one or more of these questions." Ibid.
'1 WIGmORE, EvIDENCE §§217, 218 (3d ed. 1940). The six criteria listed in
the text are the most common ones; for others, see ibid. See also STANSBURY,
NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §92 n. 62 (1946 ed.).
" 1 WIGMORE, EVIDEN C §§10, 194, 216 (3d ed. 1940).
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commit a similar crime) ?" there is substituted the inquiry, "Does this
evidence fall within any exceptions to the rule of exclusion?" In so
doing, the court's statement of the rule has, in the past, tempted judges
to dispense altogether with the test of relevancy, even though the ques-
tion still must be asked under the latter inquiry, "Is the evidence offered
relevant to show intent, etc. ?"8 The resulting confusion has admittedly
beclouded the rule itself by making its application more difficult and
uncertain.9 The premise upon which the rule was founded is directed
toward the prevention of proof of guilt by proof of propensity to com-
mit similar crimes.' 0 Yet this very object of the rule excluding evi-
dence of similar crimes in criminal prosecutions when relevant merely
to show propensity is forgotten and the test of relevancy is by-passed
when courts pay too close attention to the list of exceptions." The
courts are prone to use the categorical exceptions as catch-alls where
it is felt that substantial justice has been accomplished in the light of
the accused's character: "He's a bad character anyway !" Such a dis-
position on the part of the courts is assuredly not in accord with what
has been called one of the distinguishing features of the Anglo-American
criminal law-the recognition and avoidance of the deep tendency of
human nature to punish, not because the victim is guilty of the crime
charged, but because he is a bad man, and may as well be condemned
now that he is caught.1
2
Although Mr. Chief Justice Stacy, in the principal case, formulates
the rule of exclusion in its troublesome context, he has rendered a dis-
tinguished service toward the clarification of the confusion that existed
in the application of the rule by recalling that, "The exception requires
a more relevant base than the mere disposition of the accused to commit
such crimes. . . . The touchstone is logical relevancy as distinguished
from certain distraction.' 3  Thus, he reinstates the principles of
relevancy and the doctrines of auxiliary policy14 in the rule excluding
evidence of other crimes offered in criminal prosecutions in North
Carolina.
At the same time he recognizes with admirable frankness that a
number of North Carolina cases have been inconsistent in the applica-
tion of the rule. The four cases' 5 selected by the Chief Justice for this
'Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV.
L. REv. 988, 1005 (1938).
' Ibid.; State v. Fowler, 230 N. C. 470, 473, 53 S. E. 2d 853, 855 (1949).
10 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §194 (3d ed. 1940).
" Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HAgv.
L. REV. 988, 1006 (1938).
"1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§57, 194 (3d ed. 1940).
13 State v. Fowler, 230 N. C. 470, 473, 53 S. E. 2d 853, 855 (1949).
142 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §1906 (3d ed. 1940).
" State v. Edwards, 224 N. C. 527. 31 S. E. 2d 516 (1944) (defendant charged
with incest and carnal knowledge of his daughter; evidence that defendant had
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criticism are striking reminders of that jurisprudential reasoning which
blindly applies the exceptions to a broad rule of exclusion as though
the exceptions were nothing more than well worn cliches used to cloak
the particular court's personal estimate of the defendant. Relevancy is
ignored; the object of the rule defeated.
Approximately seventy cases in North Carolina have involved the
rule excluding evidence of other crimes in criminal prosecution; of that
number fifty-two cases admitted the evidence and eighteen cases held
the evidence inadmissible.' 6 One might wish that the Chief Justice had
mentioned several other North Carolina decisions that confuse the pic-
made improper advance of a similar nature to older daughter on prior occasions
admitted by trial court to show "intent or guilty knowledge"; affirmed by Supreme
Court as evidencing "intent as well as the unnatural lust of the defendant in at-
tempting to commit the crimes charged in the bill" [emphasis supplied]; State v.
*Biggs, 224 N. C. 722, 32 S. E. 2d 352 (1944) (defendants charged with murder
in commission of robbery; evidence tending to show that the three defendants on
a date twenty-seven days after the homicide perpetrated a hold-up and robbery
in same manner and same method as used in first robbery admitted by trial court
on the question of "intent, guilty knowledge and identification"; affirmed by Supreme
Court as "competent for the purpose to which limited ... to show the identity
of the persons . . ."; evidence of an attempt of one of the defendants to escape
from jail while awaiting trial was admitted by trial court and not questioned by
Supreme Court) ; State v. Kelly, 216 N. C. 627, 6 S. E. 2d 533 (1940) (defendants
charged with murder in commission of robbery; evidence that one of the defend-
ants was an escaped prisoner and that he had escaped with a co-conspirator killed
in the robbery admitted by trial court and approved by Supreme Court to "show
quo anino, intent, design, or guilty knowledge.. .") ; State v. Flowers, 211 N. C.
721, 192 S. E. 110 (1937) (defendants charged with conspiracy to rob by means
of assault with firearms; evidence that a week after the alleged robbery the
state's witness and defendant conspired to burn and did burn an automobile to
defraud insurance company admitted by trial court to "show identity or guilty
knowledge"; affirmed by Supreme Court without specifying which exception to
rule of exclusion applicable).
16 The following cases represent decisions applying the rule of exclusion in
North Carolina and supplement those cases cited in Note, 16 N. C. L. REv. 24
(1937) :
A. Evidence held inadmissible:
State v. Choate, 228 N. C. 491, 46 S. E. 2d 476 (1948) (abortion and murder;
evidence tending to show commission by defendant of other distinct and independent
offenses of similar nature admitted originally by trial judge but subsequently jury
instructed to disregard; reversible error); State v. Godwin, 224 N. C. 846, 32
S. E. 2d 609 (1945) (conspiracy to murder; evidence: defendant's profane com-
ments on previous fire); State v. Wilson, 217 N. C. 123, 7 S. E. 2d 11 (1940)
(embezzlement; evidence: statements by judge and foreman of grand jury sug-
gesting irregularities in public guardianship account and order of court removing
defendant as public guardian on grounds of mismanagement); State v. Lee, 211
N. C. 326, 190 S. E. 234 (1937) (maliciously burning a barn; evidence: indictment
of defendant on previous occasion for assault with a deadly weapon).
B. Evidence held admissible:
State v. Davis, 229 N. C. 386, 50 S. E. 2d 37 (1948) (fornication and adultery;
evidence: similar attempts on another person) ; State v. Biggs, 224 N. C. 722, 32
S. E. 2d 352 (1944) (facts stated in note 15 supra) ; State v. Edwards, 224 N. C.
527, 31 S. E. 2d 516 (1944) (facts stated in note 15 supra) ; State v. Harris, 223
N. C. 697, 28 S. E. 2d 232 (1947) (murder; evidence: that defendant shot and
killed three people at same place in a matter of seconds); State v. Batson, 220
N. C 411, 17 S. E. 2d 511, 139 A. L. R. 614 (1941) (attempt to commit barratry;
evidence: testimony that defendant had urged others to enter into suits) ; State
v. Kelly, 216 N. C. 627, 6 S. E. 2d 533 (1940) (facts stated in note 15 mspra);
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ture and becloud the application of the broad rule of exclusion ;17 but
an even more commendable desire is that the principal case may be used
as a precedent for the reaffirmation in principle of the basic rule favor-
ing the admissibility of all relevant facts, with the character rule ex-
ception, unhampered by the illogical and inconsistent applications of the
so-called exceptions to a broad rule of exclusion. The result would
merely be the adaptation of the court's understanding of the present
phraseology of the rule of exclusion to that statement of the basic rule
already accepted by many state courts,' 8 the federal courts,19 the Model
Code of Evidence20 and by leading text-writers on evidence :21
"Evidence of other offenses is inadmissible if its only rele-
vancy is to show the character of the accused or his disposition
to commit an offense of the nature of the one charged; but if it
tends to prove any other relevant fact it will not be excluded
merely because it also shows him to have been guilty of an inde-
penden crime. '22
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State v. Payne, 213 N. C. 719, 197 S. E. 573 (1938) (murder of highway patrol-
man in process of escaping from him; evidence: subsequent escapes by defendants
from highway patrolmen involving a shooting duel, weapons taken from defend-
ant's car 4Y2 months after murder exhibited to jury piece by piece) ; State v. Smoak,
213 N. C. 79, 195 S. E. 72 (1938) (murder of daughter by strychnine poisoning;
evidence: insurance on life of daughter, defendant had insured lives of first and
second wives successively and had collected insurance after second wife died of
strychnine poisoning, first wife in last illness stated in defendant's presence that
she had been poisoned, a third person upon whose life defendant had taken out in-
surance policy had serious but not fatal attack of strychnine poisoning) ; State v.
Flowers, 211 N. C. 721, 192 S. E. 110 (1937) (facts stated in note 15 supra);
State v. O'Higgins, 178 N. C. 708, 100 S. E. 438 (1919) (elopement with married
woman; evidence: abandonment of motherless child by defendant to elope with
woman); State v. Wade, 169 N. C. 306, 84 S. E. 768 (1915) (fornication and
adultery; evidence: previous sexual intercourse); State v. Broadway, 157 N. C.
598, 72 S. E. 987 (1911) (incest; evidence: other acts of intercourse); State v.
White, 89 N. C. 462 (1883) (larceny of hogs; evidence: neighbors of defendant
lost hogs about same time that defendant had sold dressed hogs, defendant had
denied and admitted the sale in same conversation).
7 E.g., State v. Davis, 229 N. C. 386, 50 S. E. 2d 37 (1948) (fornication and
adultery; evidence: testimony of another child in orphanage of which defendant
was superintendent that he had made similar attempts on her admitted by trial
court to show "attitude, animus and purpose." Affirmed by Supreme Court);
State v. Batson, 220 N. C. 411, 17 S. E. 2d 511, 139 A. L. R. 614 (1941) (attempt
to commit barratry; evidence: incitements to litigation other than those specific-
ally charged held admissible to show "intent, motive and scienter"); State v.
Payne, 213 N. C. 719, 197 S. E. 573 (1938) (murder of a highway patrolman in
process of escaping from him; evidence: subsequent escapes from highway patrol-
men involving a shooting duel admitted as "tending to show the state of mind of
the defendants at the time of the killing." Evidence of weapons captured in car
with defendants 42 months after killing admitted, weapon by weapon, beforejury. E.g., cases collected in Note, 22 TEMP. L. Q. 459 (1949) ; Stone, The Rule
of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1938).
" Lovely v. United States, 169 F. 2d 386 (C. C. A. 4th 1948) ; Note, 22 TEmp.
L. Q. 459 (1949).2 0 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 311 (1942).
211 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §216 (3d ed. 1940); STANSnURY, NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE §91 (1946 ed.).2
' STANSDURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §91 (1946 ed.).
19491
